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Black-boxing the Black Flag: Anonymous Sharing Platforms
and ISIS Content Distribution Tactics
by Ahmad Shehabat & Teodor Mitew

Abstract
The study examines three anonymous sharing portals employed strategically by the Islamic State of Iraq and
Sham (ISIS) to achieve its political ends. This study argues that anonymous sharing portals such as Sendvid.com,
Justpast.it, and Dump.to have been instrumental in allowing individual jihadists to generate content, disseminate
propaganda and communicate freely while routing around filtering practiced by popular social media networks.
The study draws on Actor Network Theory (ANT) in examining the relationship between ISIS jihadists and the
emergence of anonymous sharing portals. The study suggests that, even though used prior to the massive degrading
operation across social media, anonymous sharing portals were instrumental in allowing ISIS to maintain its
networking structure in the face of coordinated disruption.

Keywords: Anonymous sharing portals, Actor Network Theory, black boxing, Islamic State, degrading
operation, Sendvid, Justpaste, Dump.to.

Introduction
The rise of distributed communication networks has offered new possibilities for the emergence and expansion
of terror networks. Since its emergence in 2013, the so called Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS)1 managed to
utilise sophisticated digital media communication technologies to disseminate globally its propaganda content
and foster communication between its members. In particular, images and video footage aimed to generate fear
have been successfully broadcasted globally by the ISIS propaganda network. Noticing a correlation between
the growing spread of ISIS propaganda videos on social media platforms, anonymous sharing portals, and the
rise of terrorist activity in the Middle East and Europe, in 2015 the US government established countermeasures
aimed to degrade and hinder the spread of ISIS propaganda online. These efforts included deletion of ISIS
online content, suspension of social media accounts, as well as hacker attacks against the websites used by ISIS
affiliates, and were largely successful in suppressing ISIS propaganda across popular social media platforms.[1]
In a clear effort to adapt to these countermeasures and sustain its information flows ISIS moved the core of
its propaganda network to other online platforms substituting for popular sites such as Twitter and YouTube.
These were primarily encrypted communication channels such as Telegram, Signal, and WhatsApp, as well as
anonymous sharing portals such as Justpaste.it, Sendvid.com and Dump.to. We refer to them as ‘anonymous’
because they protected the anonymity of their users and were at the time little known to a wider internet audience.
It is important to emphasise that ISIS used these channels even before the network degrading countermeasures
it faced, however at the time they arguably played an auxiliary role in the overall communication strategy of
1 Also known as IS, ISIL, and Daesh.
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the organisation.
The aim of this article is to propose an examination of ISIS’s use of these portals as a response to the
countermeasures against its online propaganda operations. We suggest that anonymous sharing portals such as
Sendvid.com, Justpaste.it, and Dump.to have been instrumental in allowing jihadi groups to generate content,
disseminate propaganda, and communicate freely by diminishing the effects of the broad jihadi propaganda
filtering efforts of popular social media networks. Crucially, while the majority of research attention has been
concentrated on analysing the role of encrypted communication channels such as Telegram, little attention has
been paid to anonymous sharing portals acting as black boxes for ISIS-related propaganda. Accordingly, we
argue that in order to conceptualise the dynamic role played by anonymous sharing portals in the ISIS network
we can use the conceptual toolkit developed by Actor Network Theory (ANT).
The key value that ANT brings to our analysis is an understanding of networks as dynamic phenomena that
have to be continuously rebuilt and maintained by the actors performing them. Furthermore, ANT posits that
both humans and nonhumans are network actors equally entangled in the flow of agency, and focuses on the
dynamic relations between the entities performing the network. This is of fundamental analytical importance
as it allows us to understand the agencies and “normative principles […] that build, maintain, and transform
networks”.[2] Ever since ANT’s particular methodological approach to studying networks was proposed by
Bruno Latour, its aim has been “to follow the actors […] and describe how they make associations connections,
relations, and assemblies”.[3] The ANT perspective allows researchers to develop digital methods of high
sensitivity for an online problematic, leading to the development of “‘natively digital’ research tools that ‘take
advantage of the analytic and empirical capacities that are ‘embedded in online media”.[4] In the context of
this paper, the use of ANT therefore signifies an awareness of the complexity of ISIS’s network assemblage, as
well as a perspective allowing us to conceptualise the role played by anonymous sharing platforms in ISIS’s
propaganda networks.
Due to their unique characteristics, anonymous sharing platforms play an important role in ISIS’s online
strategy, demanding a specific framework of analysis. The ease of sharing content and the anonymity of the
users create a dynamic where platforms act as automated message amplifiers, playing the role of black-boxes
in the wider information network. Virtually all users on these platforms fall in one of three often overlapping
roles: they either dynamically produce and aggregate content, act as intermediaries retranslating and curating
content across multiple platforms, or passively consume the information flowing across the network. In other
words, the content flowing through these platforms is highly dynamic and visual, lending itself to visual data
gathering and ethnographic observation. As Christopher Moore has argued, screenshots are a useful research
method in that context because “as digital tools, they diminish permanence in exchange for malleability and
performativity. As media objects, they can be dynamically traced across the networks of their dissemination and
require a re-evaluation of the axioms of cultural production that considers texts independently of experience”.
[5]
We first examine the broad online effects of the countermeasures aimed at the ISIS propaganda network. Using
the notion of a black box drawn from ANT, we then examine the relationship between ISIS jihadists and the
emergence of anonymous sharing platforms. Finally, we look at three anonymous sharing portals in an effort
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to understand how they could have contributed to ISIS’s information operations.

The Rise of ISIS on Social Media
Since its appearance in 2013, ISIS quickly gained notoriety as a terror network, arguably due to the savagery
it demonstrated against its enemies and people under its control. Concurrently, ISIS appeared to quickly
recognize the importance of digital communication tools in its self-proclaimed goal to establish a global
Caliphate. Images of savagery were broadcasted virally through social media networks and global media, and
were clearly intended to frighten enemies and lead to further gains on the ground in both Syria and Iraq.
Twitter, YouTube and Justpaste were extensively utilized by ISIS to conduct its information operations, for the
purpose of producing and disseminating propaganda videos for potential recruits and spread its radical views
among Muslim youth globally.
The role of social media platforms in aiding terror organizations has been examined extensively by scholars,
journalists and think tanks. For example, the former Google CEO Eric Schmitt pointed out that ISIS and
its supporters are “producing as many as 90,000 tweets and other social media responses every day”.[6] The
importance of utilizing media by terror networks was highlighted by Philip Sieb and Dana Janbek, who argued
that media are the oxygen of terrorism.[7] Furthermore, Abdel Bari Atwan argues that the internet helped ISIS
to achieve its recruiting objectives and territorial ambitions in short time.[8] That is, digital communication
tools “allow terrorist groups to become regional or even global players […] [they] also allow terrorists to work
more effectively […] to protect communications”.[9]
However, the social media activities of ISIS were monitored closely by the U.S and proprietors of social media
platforms,[10] and were met by a series of countermeasures intended to degrade ISIS’s online presence.[11]
In our opinion, the efforts to deploy countermeasures against ISIS’s online offensive by the US and anti-ISIS
powers have demonstrated three distinct phases of development.
Phase one: Degrade and Destroy. The US government requested Twitter and Google to delete ISIS’s active
accounts on their platforms.[12] This measure resulted in deleting thousands of accounts and messages, in
effect leading to a global cyberwarfare campaign against ISIS affiliates.
Phase two: Countering ISIS propaganda. To compete with ISIS propaganda online, the US government directed
the efforts of the Centre of Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC),[13] which debuted with
a video production titled “Welcome to ISIS Land”. According to Scott Higham, “the video became a viral
phenomenon — viewed more than 844,000 times on YouTube — and a cause of significant irritation to its
target”.[14] In addition, the CSCC launched the “Turn Away Think Again”2 page on Twitter to stop foreign
fighters joining ISIS and documenting atrocities committed by ISIS jihadists. In return, ISIS launched the “Run
Do Not Walk to U.S. Terrorist State” page on Twitter to recruit potential members from the West.
Phase three: Hacking and Information warfare. Part of the less overt efforts at suppressing jihadist propaganda
online, the hacktivist group Anonymous declared ‘Operation ISIS’. Andrew Griffin suggests that this operation
2 Now called DOS team, operating in both Arabic and English it produces videos showing the brutality of ISIS and raising awareness among
Arab and Muslim youth.
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concentrated its efforts on searching and neutralising ISIS online content on both social media platforms and
websites using Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks.[15] Known as #Op-ice-ISIS, this operation
succeeded in paralysing hundreds of ISIS-related channels of information dissemination, such as the ‘The
Dawn of Glad Tidings’ app (#op_Isis, 2015). This app, according to Jim Berger (2015) was the official mobile
phone application disseminating the latest news about ISIS operations.[16]
The online war against ISIS has reached a point where the US coalition forces, Anonymous hackers and other
anti-ISIS actors have managed to seriously degrade ISIS information dissemination capabilities across popular
social media networks. The consequences of countering ISIS propaganda on popular social media platforms
enforced ISIS to shift the emphasis of its information operation to anonymous digital portals and encrypted
communication channels such as Justpaste.it, Sendvid.com, Dump.to, Share.it, Woodvid.com, Archive.org, as
well as Telegram, WordPress, Pinterest and Tumblr.
Many scholars have observed the relation between the emergence of anonymous sharing portals and the wide
spread of terror narratives. For instance, Alvares and Dahlgern have highlighted the role played by web 2.0
platforms in the pervasiveness of terror narratives by creating space for uncensored violent content.[17] Filesharing portals, videos, and personal spaces are used to target different audiences, namely, supporters, public
opinion and enemies. This observation is also corroborated by Klausen, when he argues that the “jihadist
insurgents in Syria and Iraq use all manner of social media apps and file-sharing platforms, most prominently
Ask.fm, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Pal Talk, kik, viper, JustPaste.it, and Tumblr”.[18]
That being said, it is important to note that anonymous sharing portals such as Telegram, Justpaste.it, Sendvid.
com, and Dump.to were already used by ISIS as auxiliary communication channels prior to the degrading
operation. However, as we aim to demonstrate, coordinated filtering across popular social media forced ISIS to
switch its primary information operations to these platforms and to leverage them as communication blackboxes, thus circumventing the primary vector of the campaign against its operations.
Telegram in particular, largely due to its native support of encrypted one-to-one and one-to-many
communications, has been widely adopted by ISIS and its affiliates globally following the start of the filtering
campaign against it in the fall of 2014. The significance of ISIS’ use of the platform lies in the ability to establish
multi-purpose channels strengthening its propaganda machine. Crucially, this allows for ISIS affiliates, only
latently connected to the central hubs of the organization, to both receive and share a coherent centralized
propaganda message as well as establish encrypted communication channels with each other. Such anonymous
channels therefore act as systems of coordination, message reinforcement, and activity planning.
A separate analysis by the authors of this paper, published elsewhere, suggests that ISIS-related Telegram
channels play a critical role in personal communication between potential recruits and the dissemination of
propaganda encouraging ‘lone wolf ’ attacks.[19] This study, however, focuses on the less known anonymous
sharing platforms Justpaste.it, Sendvid.com, and Dump.to, used by ISIS in furthering its information operations
and communication objectives.
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Degrading ISIS Online Activities
Popular social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube are using their terms of service (TOS) to
exercise control over the type of information produced and disseminated through their networks. For example,
YouTube’s TOS state in relation to hateful, violent and graphic content that, “it’s not okay to post violent or gory
content that’s primarily intended to be shocking, sensational or disrespectful. If a video is particularly graphic
or disturbing, it should be balanced with additional context and information”.3 Jacob Silverman observed that
YouTube acts robustly when dealing with terror content. It only takes couple of clicks to delete content and
suspend associated accounts.[20] Under YouTube’s TOS, the platform reserves the right to remove content
and in some instances, suspend accounts. According to a YouTube spokesperson, “YouTube has clear policies
prohibiting content intended to incite violence, and we remove videos violating these policies when flagged by
our users. We also terminate any account registered by a member of a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization
and used in an official capacity to further its interests”.
Berger and Strathearn indicated that when it comes to freedom of speech, social media platforms are biased.
They suggest that these platforms should make it clear that freedom of speech is limited when it comes to
using their service.[21] In a similar vein, Twitter governs what is posted against its TOS policies. With rising
international pressure on these social network platforms, particularly from the US government over ISIS’s
online materials, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube have acted swiftly and imposed harsh policies targeting
gruesome content generated by ISIS. Twitter, for instance, waged a ‘Twitter war’ against pro-ISIS accounts and
managed to suspend many thousands of accounts which resulted in significant degradation of ISIS’ Twitter
presence.
In their report, The ISIS Twitter Census, Jim Berger and Johnathan Morgan collected Twitter data in an attempt
to map ISIS’s activities on that platform.[22] The study was based on a sample of 20,000 ISIS supporter accounts,
and it established, among others, that in October through November 2014 “at least 46,000 Twitter accounts
were used by ISIS supporters”.[23] The study also revealed that 20,000 confirmed ISIS supporters are residing
in the territories controlled by the Islamic State. Saudi Arabia was the second-most common location for ISIS
supporters. In addition, one fifth of ISIS supporters used English and almost three quarters selected Arabic as
their primary language. It also appeared that the broad countermeasures aimed at degrading ISIS propaganda
was successful, at least in part because of wide Twitter account suspensions. The authors concluded that the
mass account suspension strategy – known as “whack-a-mole”— is highly successful as a network degrading
tool, and that ISIS finds it challenging to keep up with replacing suspended accounts without suffering any
negative consequences.

3 YouTube TOS page: https://www.youtube.com/static?gl=AU&template=terms
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Figure 1: A tweet posted by J.M. Berger on 20 September 2014.

In other words, the latter study offers conclusive evidence that when account suspensions are carried out on a
consistent basis across a range of platforms they have an adverse effect on the targeted network. While Twitter
has been largely successful in suppressing ISIS propaganda, Silverman suggests that hosting extreme content
poses long-term challenges for all social media platforms,[24] and that YouTube and Facebook in particular
must keep updating their tools in order to dynamically trace and report graphic materials disseminated by
potential terrorists. In this respect, proactive monitoring of platforms and targeted account removals have
noticeably harmed ISIS’ content distribution and propaganda tactics on social media.
Interestingly, and in an apparent effort to resist such persistent network degrading operations, ISIS has tried
to recruit personnel tasked with mitigating the effects of network attacks and sustaining their information
operation. As Atwan observed in 2015, “most of Islamic state commanders and recruits are tech-savvy; coding
(writing software programs putting information in html) is as familiar to them as their mother tongue. Most of
the digital caliphate business is conducted online, from recruitment to propaganda to battlefield strategy and
instructions”.[25] ISIS members and sympathizers have specifically targeted unpoliced, anonymous, and safe
sharing platforms allowing the anonymous dissemination of uncensored content. Often, such platforms are
also relatively obscure and unknown to the wider public, a factor contributing to their anonymity.
Ironically, and in a development reminiscent of the network-centric warfare theories of John Boyd, the overall
success of the strategy of degrading any overt social media presence by ISIS appears to have led to the rapid
changing of media dissemination tactics by ISIS, and the fast adoption of anonymous alternatives. Specifically,
it appears that the ISIS switch to anonymous and obscure alternatives to popular social media platforms was
made possible through the adoption of storage and sharing portals such as justpaste.it, dump.to, sendvid.com,
archive.org, dailymotion.com and liveleak.com. As John Boyd (1976) famously argued, “generating a rapidly
changing environment—that is, engaging in activity that is so quick it is disorienting and appears uncertain or
ambiguous to the enemy—inhibits the adversary’s ability to adapt and causes confusion and disorder that, in
turn, causes an adversary to overreact or underreact... [T]he message is that whoever can handle the quickest
rate of change is the one who survives”.[26] Boyd famously suggested that to win in an environment of high
information density one has to manoeuvre at speed and therefore operate inside the Observe, Orient, Decide
and Act (OODA) loop of your adversary. The weaponization of anonymous sharing platforms has arguably
enabled ISIS to mass-disseminate propaganda while avoiding suppressive actions, an information equivalent
of manoeuvre at speed, and therefore operate inside the OODA loop of its adversaries. Furthermore, as the
authors have argued elsewhere, ISIS has successfully trialled using stigmergic swarming operations harnessing
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multiple anonymous platforms to maintain its network structure.[27]
Below, we focus on three case studies of anonymous online portals in order to illustrate their use by ISIS in
establishing new channels of content dissemination and communication, as well as examine how these portals
allowed ISIS to maintain an operational network structure.

Anonymous Platforms as Black Boxes
As discussed above, we believe that in order to understand how ISIS has managed to route around extensive
account suspension operations waged against it on popular social media platforms it is necessary to examine
the role played by anonymous sharing platforms with a conceptual toolkit informed by ANT.[28] From an
ANT perspective, networks are populated by entities conceptualised as actants because they simultaneously
act and are acted upon. Actants, whether human or nonhuman, always have agency, which here stands for
the ability to force change, a detour, in the interactions between networks.[29] Agency, and action in turn, are
always already the property of associations of human and nonhuman elements.[30] Accordingly, one of the
main strengths of ANT is that it allows the tracing of actors in a network, based on their actual role in the flow
of agency.[31]
When examining the role played by an anonymous sharing platform within the wider ISIS network an ANTinformed perspective makes no a priori difference between social or technical nodes in the network. All that it
sees are entities actively performing a network. However, anonymous sharing platforms immediately stand out
because they act as accelerators of information flows while making it harder to trace the logistics of how these
flows are performed. In effect, they black-box certain elements of the network. In this context, the black box is
a conceptual metaphor developed in ANT to describe network assemblages which function so well that their
internal logistics are opaque from the outside.[32] Black boxes are created through what ANT terms as ‘acts of
translation’, in which actors are first enrolled in the network, and then work to stabilise it from the inside thus
creating the appearance of a monolithic assemblage.[33] From the perspective of our case studies, the black box
concept helps to understand how ISIS maintains its networking structure by adaptively shifting operations to
less known online sharing portals.
Opening a black box allows us to examine the ways in which “a variety of social aspects and technical elements
are associated and come together as a durable whole”.[34] The notion of opening and examining a black box
is possible, because when focusing on a black-boxed entity seemingly homogenous from the outside, ANT
sees “processes, performances, socio-technical rituals, and enactments […] driven by the dynamics of making
connections, of binding things together, of extending associations, of ‘translating’ and ‘enrolling’ actors into
networks”.[35] The same could be said for the role of online sharing portals, mobile phone apps, and other
technical assemblages enrolled in the networks of ISIS affiliates.
When analysing the case studies below, it appears that ISIS is leveraging the stability and distributed nature of
their relatively established communication networks to enlist new actants which in turn help in the emergence
of new networks. Crucially, the relative opacity of less known cloud portals such as Justpaste.it and Sendvid.
com, coupled with the migration of already established distributed networks of ISIS affiliates, drawn to these
platforms by their TOS, creates a black-boxing dynamic. Ironically, the operations degrading ISIS’s overt digital
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capabilities on popular social media sites have resulted in the migration and development of this dynamic. That
is, ISIS networks seem to have reacted to the degradation of their capabilities on popular social media networks
and rapidly migrated to new anonymous portals. As Stern and Modi have pointed out, “terrorists respond to
changes in their environments by changing their mission and changing their shape. What is important in such
events is that information logistics is essential in disseminating messages of terror”.[36]

ISIS’s Black Boxes
1. Justpaste.it
Justpaste.it is a free content sharing portal providing document storage and file sharing services under the motto
of ‘sharing text and images the easy way’. The site is hosted by Cloud Flare and owned by Polish entrepreneur
Mariusz Zurawek, who sums up justpaste.it as follows: “You are able to do what you want with almost two clicks.
It doesn’t require registration, it isn’t searchable and access to specific content is only available via a link or if
it makes the ‘most popular’ page”.[37] However, early 2014 ISIS has harnessed this service to disseminate its
online videos, brutal images of beheadings, texts that aim to spread its radical ideology, and most importantly
the controversial digital edition of the ISIS online magazine ‘Dabiq’. Since its emergence in July 2014, Dabiq was
hosted by justpaste.it, and archive.org. The English language magazine ostensibly targets Western audiences to
garner new recruits [Figures 2-4].
Figure 2: Dabiq Magazine issue hosted by justpaste.it [full url is obfuscated]
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Figure 3: Tweet with extreme content posted by ISIS members on justpaste.it [full url is obfuscated]

Figure 4: Tweet with material advertising migration to ISIS-held territory posted on justpaste.it
[full url is obfuscated]

Justpaste.it not only allows ISIS to host the magazine but also offers a free folder share option which ISIS’s
networked affiliates can use to share, store and disseminate information to global audiences. The platform offers
advanced features such as pasting text directly from a word processor or a webpage, formatting and exporting
to PDF, automatic importing of images, secure content publishing, secure SSL connection, and passwordprotected access. To protect the contents of text notes from web crawlers the site allows the use of [encrypt]
tags. Indeed, one of the most valuable options Justpaste.it offers is password protection for disseminated content
which makes it a uniquely secure environment for exchanging messages or files.
Describing the site’s appeal to users, Carmen Fishwick also pointed out the easy to use template working well
even on slow internet connections.[38] Justpaste.it, also has a mobile phone app with no interruptions from
pop-ups or other advertising materials. 4 Leveraging these features, ISIS members and affiliates have utilized
Justpaste.it to send encrypted messages, upload videos and files (such as jihadi materials, books, instructions),
share information and upload online magazines. Links to content uploaded on the site have been shared via
Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, and other social media platforms to increase participation for potential recruits,
propaganda, and other logistical support. Overall, Justpaste.it appears to have proved helpful to ISIS affiliates,
as folders and files can be widely shared by only copying a hybrid link allowing the file to be printed or read
online.
4

Writing formatting tools are also available for right-to-left languages (e.g. Arabic). No logon credentials are needed and the platform

works on mobile phone devices (justpaste.it, 2014).
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Arguably, the pervasiveness of ISIS’ Dabiq and Romyiah magazines is indebted to the existence of this sharing
portal. Interestingly, files uploaded to justpaste.it can be deleted under the TOS agreement, according to
Justpaste TOS:
-

Any material posted anonymously will be deleted after five days.

-

Any content that may spread hate or cause harm will be removed instantly.

Fishwick underlines how the anonymity of justpaste.it served ISIS, noting that “JustPaste.it’s role in Islamic
state’s propaganda machine has largely gone unnoticed”.[39] All the images uploaded to the service by ISIS
members have details of a related Twitter account stamped on them. The user’s Twitter handle is also printed
at the bottom of each image, so reporters have been crediting the images to Twitter. The use of justpaste.it by
ISIS members has brought international attention to the site as the traffic approached 10 million page views a
month [Figure 5].
Figure 5: Justpaste.it traffic. Source: http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/justpaste.it

According to Google Analytics (2015), “the platform has about 2.5 million unique users a month, which works
out at about 10 million views every month”.5 Zurawek, the site’s founder, started seeing what he called “a large
growth” of traffic to his website from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. The site makes it easy to publish text,
photos or PDFs, and at the beginning of 2014 rebels and civilians in Syria discovered JustPaste.it and began
using it to post news. But sometime over the summer of 2014, Jacob Silverman notes, “jihadists discovered
it as well, and the site soon became one of the favoured tools of the Islamic State for sharing news, official
communiques, and graphic propaganda”.[40]
5

As justpaste.it tweeted on 12/Aug/2014. See, https://twitter.com/justpasteit/status/499153334377660417
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As stated by its founder, the site “does not compete with advanced online text editors, such as Google Docs or
Microsoft Office 365, but rather creates a place that is extremely easy and simple to use. It’s similar to Pastebin,
the service popular with hackers, but with image files too”.[41] As the activity of ISIS on Justpaste.it drew
the attention of authorities in the United Kingdom, the police requested the site delete content including all
videos showing graphic executions at the hands of ISIS, as well as all pro-ISIS propaganda. In combating ISIS’
use of his service, Zurawek commented: “It’s not my choice that ISIS has selected my site [...] As long as I’m
cooperating with the police, removing content, and not allowing ISIS to make propaganda, I think it’s good for
the site that many people will know about it”.[42]
The architecture of justpaste.it, coupled with the possibility of using VPNs and TOR to obfuscate IP addresses
makes it hard to ban specific users.[43] Nevertheless, the site appears to have made an effort to police the
content uploaded by users and actively remove extremist materials. In response, an ISIS affiliate - Abo-Taloot
al-Khrasani - messaged Zurawek to condemn the site’s efforts to police uploaded content. This demonstrates
how significant the platform is to ISIS in maintaining its communication and dissemination structure. In the
letter below the author claims that 70% of justpase.it traffic is ISIS content [Figure 6].
Figure 6: A copy of letter sent by Abo Talout al-Khurasani to Zurawek (source: justpaste.it)

2. Sendvid.com
Sendvid is an instant video upload portal used by ISIS to route around wide account suspension and content
deletion on YouTube and Daily Motion. Specifically, ISIS media production outlets such as Al-Hayat, al-Furqan,
and al-Etisam extensively used the video uploading portal in their propaganda dissemination. High-definition
quality videos such as Flames of War, Message Covered with Blood, and Healing of the Hearts were first uploaded
to Sendvid, and then popularized virally through Twitter follower networks. A simple search for Sendvid on
Twitter returns mostly links to ISIS propaganda videos. Sendvid is a crucial element of ISIS’s information
logistics as videos linked to Sendvid can also be shared via other social networks such as Facebook, Twitter,
archive.org, Tumblr, Telegram, dump.to and e-mail, or can be stored in users’ Google drive or Dropbox for
future retrieval.
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Sendvid has been used by ISIS affiliates early 2015 to widely copy and aggregate propaganda materials, thus
building publicly available collections of terrorist-related content. As Remzy Mahzam points out, “the electronic
digitisation of the extremist identity of ISIS has been made effective through its frequent injection of videos,
incessant release of periodicals and downloading of visual reports in multiple languages, eventually building up
a digital compendium that will remain accessible for future generations for reference”.[44] Furthermore, unlike
YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, where admins are alerted to remove both jihadi content and the associated
accounts, Sendvid is a safely unpoliced archiving platform where data can be uploaded anonymously even
under false Facebook, Twitter or Google accounts.
The following appears to be the standard reply to enquiries regarding jihadi content by the Sendvid Support
Team: “Thank you for contacting us regarding this matter. As a service provider, we try to promote freedom
of speech and remain as neutral as possible to all groups regardless of their views. With that being said, we do
work with several foreign and domestic agencies in removing videos that we deem to be in violation of our
Terms of Service. If you encounter any videos that violate our TOS, we encourage you to report them to our
abuse department at: abuse@sendvid.com”. In theory, all online sharing portals have very much the same TOS
in regard to removing videos or documents promoting violence. Sendvid’s TOS are quite clear that the service
does not allow “adult, obscene, illegal or objectionable content”, and that “accounts and content that violate this
will be removed without warning”. In practice, Sendvid host these videos unless explicitly notified of breach of
TOS. Most of the gruesome videos uploaded by ISIS are in fact still available on the Sendvid service, and are
freely shared on Twitter [Figure7 - 8].

Figure 7: Video titled ‘The happiness of almojahideen’ posted to Sendvid.
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Figure 8: Sendvid links to ISIS content, titled: message to the tyrants of Jordan.

Interestingly, recently Sendvid has become a preferred site for pornographic materials, which appears to have
caused ISIS affiliates to reduce their presence as this contradicts with Islamic Sharia values.

3. Dump.to
Dump.to is an online sharing platform with no login credentials,6 using archive.is as a web carrier. The sharing
portal also has no clear TOS policies that govern dissemination of content. The importance of this service
in the context of ISIS is that it allows users to share, upload and converge links from similar sharing sites
such as justpast.it and sendvid.com where all types of data can be stored and shared via link to ISIS’ affiliate
networks. Dump.to allows documents, video, voice messages, and music to be stored and shared, which in
turn allows ISIS affiliates to aggregate, edit, curate, re-classify, and re-publish jihadi propaganda content. In
addition, content shared on the site can be protected by password, and be commented on and edited by anyone
using a pseudonym or anonymously. Most importantly, the lack of policing and governance makes Dump.to a
vital medium for information sharing among jihadists, who can communicate in the open through encrypted
messages posted directly through the site’s interface.
The site hosts most of ISIS’ online video propaganda content, as well as jihadi music (nasheed), Dabiq magazine
links, and extreme jihadi books. For example, most of ISIS’s controversial books such as Hijra to the Islamic state
(migrating to ISIS land) and How to Survive in the West were available to download for free, arguably helping
ISIS to recruit western affiliates and encouraging migration to ISIS-controlled territories (Figures 9-14).

6

Dump.to is registered to a German company operating behind the kasserver.com domain
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Figure 9: iBRABO highlights the use of dump.to by ISIS

Figure 10: Jihadi training materials, books, and propaganda

Figure 11: Dabiq propaganda magazine on Dump.to web addresses
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Figure 12: Dump.to hosts Welayat news

Figure 13: Some significant dumps by Al Hayat media centre (news reports, breaking news)

Figure 14: ISIS breaking news shared instantly on Dump.to
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Dump.to considers itself a free and anonymous publishing platform that never takes responsibility for content
being published. Typical of similar sharing portals, Dump.to TOS claim to prevent content or material
containing child pornography, phishing & malware, violent threats, spam campaigns, private and confidential
information, invasion of privacy.7

Discussion
As their presence started to fade on Twitter and YouTube as a result of the globally coordinated filtering campaign,
ISIS decided to move the primary hub of their information operations to anonymous sharing portals such as
Telegram, Justpaste.it, Sendvid.com, and Dump.to. This was a strategic decision, as these sites transitioned
from being auxiliary platforms to primary communication and dissemination channels in ISIS’s strategy. The
characteristics and typology of these anonymous sharing portals, ready templates, easy video uploads and
mobile phone supported applications created participatory media environments where information can be
accessed across multiple social media networks. It is estimated that Justpaste.it, Sendvid.com and Dump.to
portals have contributed around 20% of information disseminated by ISIS to Twitter alone (Figure 15).

Figure 15: Detrimental Use of Social Media by Daesh. An Information Warfare Perspective

Source: Joseph Shasheen, ‘Detrimental Use of Social Media and the Case of Daesh: An Information Warfare Perspective’, Riga Strategic
Communication Dialogue: Perception Matters, August 2015.
7 An enquiry about ISIS’ use of Dump.to services leads to the following standard reply from the company:
Dear visitor,
We are sorry that you have found improper content in our network. Please note that in order to process your abuse report and
protect our users’ privacy and integrity, we request that you provide a photo ID (ID/Driving License/Passport/...) within 24
hours by replying to this email.
NOTE: Your report will automatically be rejected if you do not submit the requested documents
Dump.To team.
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To an extent, these new sharing portals empower ISIS’s message by enhancing connectivity in the network and
by adding more actors to its structure. From an ANT perspective, these new sharing portals serve as information
intermediaries, allowing for fluid and anonymous information aggregation, curation, and dispersal. Publicly
available, no-login anonymity allows links and content to be aggregated and mass-distributed continuously
and with variable dynamic intensity based on ad-hoc requirements. These platform architectures allowed ISIS
to maintain its flow of information, enlist new actors, and leverage its distributed affiliate and sympathizer
networks to reach and mobilize potential jihadists around the world. Furthermore, as we suggested above,
anonymous sharing platforms play a key role in the ongoing information warfare waged by ISIS. By using
anonymous sharing platforms as black boxes in its information network, ISIS was able to route around
social media account suspensions, and leverage these platforms as strategic information weapons serving its
information operation objectives.
Importantly, as Krieger and Belliger point out, enhancing connectivity across the network generates information
flows that are “increasingly difficult to control and steer”.[45] It can be argued that anonymous sharing portals
such as Sendvid.com, Justpast.it and Dump.to, “consisting neither of objects nor subjects, but actors and
mediators”,[46] act as enabling black box media hubs in ISIS’ sinformation operation strategy.
In examining the TOS policies of social media networks and anonymous sharing portals in relation to ISIS use
of their services, we found out that the financial capabilities and reputation of Twitter, Facebook and Google
motivated them to take immediate actions against jihadi content. Meanwhile, the three anonymous sharing
portals we examined have the overriding aim of expanding their user-base, and seem to have extremely limited
resources to track down content disseminated by ISIS or other extremist networks who seek an easy, secure
and fast medium of communication. The lack of resources makes policing and active removal of ISIS content
prohibitively expensive to the proprietors of these platforms.
Moreover, as already mentioned, the coordinated campaign to police Twitter and YouTube for jihadist content
has forced ISIS to shift its focus towards using anonymous sharing portals as primary tools for aggregation
and dissemination of propaganda content. The anonymous functionality of these portals acts as a black box,
obfuscating the logistics of ISIS’s global propaganda network. When coupled with the ability to create hybrid
weblinks and PDF files, which then can be disseminated across most social media, these platforms enable the
rapid redistribution of content even under conditions of drastic policing and filtering. Even though anonymous
sharing portals seem to have intensified their efforts to remove ISIS-related content, this does not solve the
underlying problem as ISIS affiliates can still use these services as aggregators for content advertised on other
anonymous social media platforms such as Telegram.

Conclusion
This article is a first step in examining the role of anonymous sharing portals in relation to the dissemination
of ISIS propaganda and network communication in the aftermath of the global ISIS-related content degrading
operation orchestrated by the most popular social media platforms. Our aim was to highlight the significance
of anonymous sharing portals in terms of ISIS’s propaganda campaign. We argued that anonymous sharing
portals acted as black boxes for ISIS-related propaganda content, helping terror networks to sustain high-

ISSN 2334-3745

97

February 2018

PERSPECTI VES O N TERRORISM

Volume 12, Issue 1

intensity information flows and maintain global communication channels. The emergence of these portals has
fundamentally changed the way ISIS distributes its propaganda globally, in that these platforms allow terror
networks safe aggregation and the ability to disseminate content links rapidly across popular social media
without suffering from efforts to degrade the network. This in turn has enabled terror networks to maintain
global information operations even in the face of coordinated efforts at policing and filtering.
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